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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
  Randall Billups was the passenger in a car driven by a woman suspected of attempting 
to obtain a package containing heroin.  The car was stopped by Meridian police officers, 
Mr. Billups was taken into custody and transported to the police station, he was given his 
Miranda warnings, and he was arrested only after providing incriminating evidence.  
Mr. Billups moved to suppress the incriminating evidence he provided arguing that he had been 
arrested without probable cause, when the officers took him into custody, transported him to the 
police station, and placed him into an interrogation room.  Acknowledging that officers did not 
obtain probable cause to arrest Mr. Billups until after he provided incriminating evidence at the 
police station, the State argued that officers had merely “detained” Mr. Billups for the roughly 
90 minutes between the time he was seized and the time he provided the incriminating evidence 
at the police station.  The district court adopted the State’s argument and denied Mr. Billups’ 
motion to suppress.  A jury found Mr. Billups guilty of conspiracy to traffic in between 7 and 28 
grams of heroin, and he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum 10-year fixed term.  
 Mr. Billups asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress as the 
decision is inconsistent with well-established United States Supreme Court precedent that holds 
the very conduct the officers engaged in in this case is a clear Fourth Amendment violation.  
Furthermore, he asserts that the State will be unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the presentation of the illegally obtained evidence did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.   
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In November of 2014, employees at a Postal Annex store1 contacted law enforcement 
about a suspicious package,2 and officers discovered the package contained a bindle of black tar 
heroin wrapped in a scarf.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.3, L.1 – p.5, L.1.)  Store employees told 
Meridian Police Detective Kyle Ludwig, that similar packages had been picked up in the past 
immediately after the package arrived by one of the mailbox’s renters, Alexa Hoffman.3  
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.5, Ls.2-16.)  Detective Ludwig seized the heroin, repackaged the 
scarf, and asked Postal Annex employees to contact him when the package was picked up.  (Tr. 
Suppression Hearing, p.5, L.2 – p.6, L.4.)   
 A couple of hours later, the employees contacted the police department and Detective 
Ludwig was told that “a white female had exited a white SUV that was occupied by an 
additional party had gone in, retrieved the package, and … they had relocated to a nearby 
medical plaza parking lot.”  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.6, Ls.7-16.)  Although officers lost 
sight of the SUV for a short time, Detective Ludwig eventually initiated a traffic stop.  
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.21.)  Additional officers assisted Detective Ludwig 
in detaining Ms. Hoffman, who had been driving the SUV, and Randall Billups, who had been 
riding in the passenger seat.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.7, L.22 – p.8, L.9; p.9, Ls.12-15.)   
Detective Ludwig saw the scarf and a portion of the package on the center console, and a 
drug dog alerted on the SUV.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.9, Ls.10-22.)  A subsequent search 
revealed an open-style beach bag on the passenger-side floorboard containing a digital scale, a 
                                            
1 The Postal Annex is a shipping company that also offers office services and rents mailboxes.  
(Tr. Trial, p.195, L.8 – p.196, L.7.)   
2 Employees were suspicious and investigated the contents of the package, an envelope, because 
it was partially opened and had a piece of cloth sticking out of it.  (Tr. Trial, p.196, Ls.11-24.) 
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to-list that included a pay/owe ledger, and Ms. Hoffman’s driver’s license and financial 
transaction card – nothing in the bag indicated that Mr. Billups was the owner.  (Tr. Suppression 
Hearing, p.9, Ls.2-11; p.14, L.19 – p.15, L.24.)  The rest of the package was eventually found in 
a garbage can on a nearby street.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.9.) 
 The stop happened to occur in front of Mr. Hoffman’s residence, and her mother stood 
“in the driveway and would approach the traffic stop and [she was] warned several times that 
she just kind of needed to stay back and kind of let us do what we needed to do.”  
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.11, L.20 – p.12, L.5.)  After approximately 45 minutes, Mr. Billups 
and Ms. Hoffman were taken by officers to the Meridian Police Department, and Mr. Billups 
was placed into a locked interview room.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.10, Ls.10-24; p.17, Ls.4-
23.)  Although he did not know exactly when Mr. Billups had first been handcuffed, Detective 
Ludwig had the handcuffs removed and he interviewed Mr. Billups.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, 
p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.7; p.15, L.25 – p.17, L.3.)  Detective Ludwig read Mr. Billups his Miranda4 
rights, and Mr. Billups admitted that he knew Ms. Hoffman was picking up a package of heroin, 
and she was going to give Mr. Billups some in exchange for him setting up drug sales for her.  
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.12, L.6 – p.13, L.4.)  After he made these admissions, Mr. Billups 
granted Detective Ludwig’s request to search the contents of his cell phone, and Detective 
Ludwig found text messages consistent with illegal drug sales.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.13, 
Ls.5-12.)   
 During the approximately 90 minutes between the time Detective Ludwig stopped the 
SUV to the time Mr. Billups made his admissions, he was never free to leave.  (Tr. Suppression 
                                                                                                                                           
3 The P.O. Box was registered to Ms. Hoffman and a person identified at trial as Brandon 
Johnson.  (Tr. Trial, p.200, Ls.13-15.) 
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Hearing, p.13, Ls.13-17; p.17, L.4 – p.18, L.13.)  When asked if Mr. Billups was “in custody,” 
Detective Ludwig testified, “I wouldn’t say that he was in custody.  It was definitely a custodial 
interview where he was not free to leave.  I would qualify it more along the lines of a Terry 
stop.”  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.18, Ls.14-18.)  Mr. Billups was not arrested until after he 
made his incriminating statements.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.13, Ls.18-24.)   
 After a preliminary hearing, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Billups with 
conspiracy to traffic between 7 and 28 grams of heroin (“in excess of nine (9) grams”), naming 
Ms. Hoffman as a co-conspirator.  (R., pp.41-53.)  Mr. Billups filed a motion to suppress all 
physical and testimonial evidence obtained “when law enforcement officers illegally detained 
and searched [him] without an arrest or search warrant.”  (R., pp.101-103.)  In his memorandum 
in support, Mr. Billups argued his arrest was not supported by probable cause, as it was based 
solely on the fact that he was a passenger in a vehicle that contained controlled substances at 
one time, and in which paraphernalia was found, without any indicia that Mr. Billups owned or 
possessed either.  (R., pp.104-112.)  In its written objection, the State argued that from the time 
Mr. Billups was seized until the time he provided his incriminating evidence, he was the subject 
of an investigatory detention.  (R., pp.117-122.)  The State argued that, “the Defendant was not 
arrested until the end of his interview.”  (R., p.121.)  
 During the suppression hearing, the State conceded that Mr. Billups had standing to 
raise his motion and then provided Detective Ludwig’s testimony.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, 
p.1, L.7 – p.22, L.21.)  The State did not attempt to argue that Detective Ludwig had probable 
cause to arrest Mr. Billups until after he made his admissions at the police station; rather, the 
State continued to argue that Mr. Billups was merely the subject of an investigatory detention 
until that point.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.5.)  The State acknowledged, 
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“[t]here was, approximately, an hour-and-a-half between the initial traffic stop and Detective 
Ludwig developing probable cause for the arrest of Mr. Billups,” but argued that his detention 
during this time was reasonable considering the seriousness of the events.  Id.   
Mr. Billups’ counsel argued, “this certainly goes far beyond the Terry stop.  45-minute 
detention on scene, followed by taken into custody and transported to the Meridian City Police 
Department.  Being held there for a period of time in handcuffs.  This is a de facto arrest.”  
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.25, Ls.10-14.)  Defense counsel continued, 
Mr. Billups was not free to leave.  Mr. Billups did not consent to being 
placed into handcuffs.  Mr. Billups did not consent to being placed in the back of 
a patrol car and, then, subsequently, transported to the Meridian City Police 
Department where he was held in a locked room in handcuffs until they were 
ordered to be removed by [Detective] Ludwig.  He was not free to leave 
throughout the entire course of this time.  It is a de facto arrest.  
 
And, in the absence of probable cause or some other exception to the 
warrant requirement for an unlawful seizure, I believe the court must suppress all 
of the information that was gained from Mr. Billups in the way of statements 
after he was – certainly, there were no statements or other evidence that were 
located with regard to Mr. Billups at the scene.  But any statements, and other 
evidence that was gained from Mr. Billups, including access to his cell phone 
after he was transported and subsequently interrogated, at the Meridian City 
Police Department. 
 
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.26, Ls.6-25.) 
 The district court held that Detective Ludwig had a reasonable articulable suspicion to 
justify both the initial seizure and initial detention of Mr. Billups.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, 
p.27, L.1 – p.30, L.9.)  The court then found the following: 
 So, with that, the investigatory detention was not unlawfully protracted.  
It was a reasonable period of time given the circumstances.  Given the 
circumstances related to Ms. Hoffman’s mother continuing to inject herself into 
the investigation, the transport of Mr. Billups to the police station was 
reasonable.  The officers recognized that this was an investigatory detention and 
a custodial interview. 
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 To that extent, Mr. Billups was given his Miranda warnings and after his 
Miranda warnings, he waived those rights knowingly and voluntarily and 
consented to make statements.  The defendant’s statements that he knew that he 
was going to pick up a package of heroin; that he would typically receive heroin 
in exchange for setting up opportunities to distribute the heroin and the text 
message about the package and the heroin, certainly, gave a basis for an arrest 
for this offense. 
 
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.30, L.10 – p.31, L.2.)  The district court denied Mr. Billups’ motion 
to suppress.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.31, Ls.18-19.) 
 During the subsequent trial, Detective Ludwig testified about Mr. Billups’ admission 
that he knew Mr. Hoffman was picking up a package of heroin and that he intended on selling 
Ms. Hoffman’s heroin in exchange for a small amount of the heroin that he could ingest 
himself.  (Tr. Trial, p.376, L.13 – p.377, L.15; p.378, L.18 – p.379, L.20.)5  Detective Ludwig 
also testified that Mr. Billups provided him with his cell phone which contained text messages 
indicating the phone was used to set up drug deals, and photos taken of some of those text 
messages were admitted as exhibits.  (Tr. Trial, p.377, L.16 – p.378, L.17; p.383, L.5 – p.397, 
L.4; Exs. 9 through 31b.) 
 The jury found Mr. Billups guilty and the district court sentenced him to the mandatory 
minimum 10-year fixed term, with no indeterminate term.  (R., pp.185-188, 200, 203-206.)  
Mr. Billups filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (R., pp.211-215.)    
        
  
                                            
5 Citations to “Tr. Trial” in this brief refer to the 665-page transcript containing two pre-trial 
hearings, the bulk of the trial proceedings, and the sentencing hearing. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Billups’s motion to suppress? 
 8 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Billups’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), the United States Supreme Court found 
a Fourth Amendment violation when officers seized then transported a robbery suspect to the 
police station, where the suspect was not free to leave, and the officers lacked probable cause to 
arrest.  In the present case, officers seized Randall Billups without probable cause and took him 
to the police station, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  The district court erred in 
denying Mr. Billups motion to suppress. 
 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Billups’ Motion To Suppress 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision on a 
motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact, 
which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 
1996).   
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Its purpose is “to 
impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, 
including law enforcement agents, in order to ‘safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions.’”  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting 
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)).  If evidence is not seized either pursuant 
to a valid warrant or pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the 
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evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search or seizure must be excluded as the “fruit of 
the poisonous tree.”  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).  
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless justified by a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.  See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see 
also Dunaway, supra.  An officer may detain and individual if the officer holds an objectively 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual has been or is about to be engaged in 
criminal activity.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1968).  However, “the line is crossed when 
the police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or 
other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station, where he is 
detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes.”  Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 
(1985).  “[S]uch seizures, at least where not under judicial supervision, are sufficiently like 
arrests to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable 
cause.”  Id. 
  
1. Mr. Billups Was Arrested Without Probable Cause In Violation Of His Fourth 
Amendment Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Seizures 
 
 Mr. Billups agrees with the State’s concession, and the district court’s finding, that 
officers had no probable cause to arrest him until after he provided the incriminating evidence.  
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.5; p.27, L.1 – p.31, L.2.)  However, the Court’s 
finding that officers did not need to have probable cause to detain him and transport him 
involuntarily to the police station is directly in contradiction to United States Supreme Court 
precedent. 
 In Dunaway, officers picked up a suspect in a murder investigation at his neighbor’s 
house, drove him to police headquarters in a police car, placed him in an interrogation room, 
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Mirandized him, and questioned him about the murder.  Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203.  The 
defendant waived his right to counsel and made incriminating statements.  Id.  Because the 
defendant did not voluntarily accompany the officers to the police station, the Supreme Court 
found he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Id. at 207.  Furthermore, the State 
conceded that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant until after he made his 
incriminating statements.  Id.   
The State argued “the seizure of the petitioner did not amount to an arrest and was 
therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment because the police had a ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ that petitioner possessed ‘intimate knowledge about a serious and unsolved crime.’”  
Id. (citation omitted.)  The Supreme Court rejected the State’s claim and held the following: 
the detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguishable from a 
traditional arrest.  Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found. 
Instead, he was taken from a neighbor’s home to a police car, transported to a 
police station, and placed in an interrogation room.  He was never informed that 
he was “free to go”; indeed, he would have been physically restrained if he had 
refused to accompany the officers or had tried to escape their custody.  The 
application of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause does not 
depend on whether an intrusion of this magnitude is termed an “arrest” under 
state law.  The mere facts that petitioner was not told he was under arrest, was 
not “booked,” and would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had 
proved fruitless … obviously do not make petitioner’s seizure even roughly 
analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry [v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968)] and its progeny.  Indeed, any “exception” that could cover a 
seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule 
that Fourth Amendment seizures are “reasonable” only if based on probable 
cause. 
Id at 212–13.  Thus, the Dunaway Court found a Fourth Amendment violation. 
 The facts in Mr. Billups’ case are, in all relevant aspects, indistinguishable from the 
facts in Dunaway.  Like the defendant in Dunaway, Mr. Billups was suspected of being 
involved in a crime, placed in a police car, transported to the police station, and placed in an 
interrogation room.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.3, L.1 – p.5, L.1; p.10, Ls.10-24; p.17, Ls.4-
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23.)  Like the defendant in Dunaway, Mr. Billups was not free to leave and in fact had been 
placed in handcuffs at some point.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.10, L.10 – p.11, L.7; p.15, L.25 
– p.17, L.23.)  Like the State of New York in Dunaway, the State of Idaho concedes that no 
probable cause to arrest existed prior to Mr. Billups providing incriminating evidence during his 
interrogation.  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.5 (prosecutor arguing, “[t]here was, 
approximately, an hour-and-a-half between the initial traffic stop and Detective Ludwig 
developing probable cause for the arrest of Mr. Billups[.]”)  Finally, like the State of New York 
in Dunaway, the State of Idaho argues in this case that Mr. Billups’ 90-minute detention, 
complete with an involuntary ride to the police station in a police car, and being placed into a 
locked interrogation room, was nevertheless justified as a Terry stop.  Thus, like the defendant 
in Dunaway, Mr. Billups’ detention “was in important respects indistinguishable from a 
traditional arrest.”  Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212-23.   
 The Dunaway holding is clear and binding.  Mr. Billups’ Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from an unreasonable seizure was violated, and the district court erred in finding otherwise. 
 
2. Mr. Billups’ Incriminating Statements Were Fruits Of His Unreasonable Seizure 
And The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To Suppress  
 
 The State did not argue, and the district court did not address, the question of whether 
Mr. Billups’ incrimination statements were the product of his illegal arrest.  Regardless, the 
undisputed facts found by the district court in this case demonstrate indisputably that that such 
statements were a product of the illegal seizure and should be suppressed. 
First, Miranda warnings cannot, in and of themselves, purge the taint of a Fourth 
Amendment violation.  Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1975).  In Brown detectives 
broke into the defendant’s apartment searching for evidence of his involvement in a murder, and 
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took him into custody when he arrived home.  Id. at 592.  Although they lacked probable cause, 
the officers took the defendant to the police station, Mirandized and question him, and the 
defendant gave incriminating statements.  Id. at 593-96.   
In finding the incriminating statements should have been suppressed, the Supreme Court 
first rejected the State’s argument that giving Miranda rights automatically purges the taint of 
the illegal police action.  “If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint 
of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment 
violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted.   Id. at 602 (citing 
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969).)  The Court recognized that if Miranda 
warnings by themselves could purge the taint of an unlawful arrest, officers would be 
encouraged to engage in such actions knowing that any evidence derived from their illegal 
conduct would nevertheless be admissible.  Id.  “Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment 
violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a ‘cure-all,’ and the 
constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures could be said to be reduced to ‘a 
form of words.’” Id. at 202-03 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).)  Therefore, the 
fact that Mr. Billups’ incriminating statements were “voluntary” for Fifth Amendment purposes, 
does not mean they are necessarily admissible. 
The Brown Court held that “[t]he question whether a confession is the product of a free 
will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case.  No single fact is dispositive.”  
Id. at 597-603.  The Court noted that the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the 
presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct 
are all relevant considerations.  Id. at 603-04 (citations omitted).  The State bears the burden of 
demonstrating the admissibility of statements made after an illegal arrest.  Id. at 604. 
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The Brown Court held that the statements in that case should have been suppressed, 
noting that they were separated from the illegal arrest by less than two hours, there was no 
intervening event of significance, and the officers knew that they had no probable cause to 
arrest the defendant, but did so anyway hoping to drum up incriminating evidence.  Id. at 604-
05.  The Court in Dunaway found “[t]he situation in this case is virtually a replica of the 
situation in Brown,” and found that the evidence obtained in that case should have been 
suppressed.  Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218.  In Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003), the Supreme 
Court found that the defendant’s unlawful arrest, the lack of any intervening events, and the 
officers being conscientious that they lacked probable cause to arrest, all weighed in favor of 
suppression, despite the fact that the unlawfully detained 17-year-old was Mirandized before 
providing the incriminating statements.  
Like the defendants in Brown, Dunaway, and Kaupp, the only factor weighing in favor 
of admissibility of Mr. Billups’ incriminating statements is the fact that he was Mirandized prior 
to giving them.  The time between his initial detention and his incriminating statements was 
approximately 90 minutes – 45 of which came when he was undoubtedly the subject of an 
illegal arrest by virtue of being involuntarily transported to the police station.6  (Tr. Suppression 
Hearing, p.10, Ls.10-14; p.13, Ls.13-17.) A handcuffed Mr. Billups was placed in a locked 
interrogation room, and was only un-cuffed when Detective Ludwig interrogated him.  
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.11, Ls.2-7.)  The State simply presented no evidence of any 
                                            
6 Detective Ludwig certainly had a reasonable articulable suspicion justifying Mr. Billups’ 
initial detention, as there was at least a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Hoffman was involved in 
dealing heroin and Mr. Billups was a passenger in her car when he pulled it over.  While it is 
not clear from the record when the initial detention actually turned into an illegal arrest, at the 
very least, Mr. Billups was arrested when he was involuntarily placed in the police car and 
transported to the police station – a detention in “important respects indistinguishable from a 
traditional arrest.”  Dunaway, 442 U.S. 212-13. 
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intervening circumstances that may indicate Mr. Billups’ incriminating statements were not the 
product of his illegal arrest.  Finally, Detective Ludwig implicitly recognized that he did not 
have probable cause to arrest as he testified, “I wouldn’t say that he was in custody.  It was 
definitely a custodial interview where he was not free to leave.  I would qualify it more along 
the lines of a Terry stop.”  (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.18, Ls.14-18.)  For the 35 years prior to 
Detective Ludwig’s actions in this case, the United States Supreme Court has held that taking a 
person into custody, involuntarily transporting them in a police car to a police station, and 
placing them in an interrogation room prior to conducting a “custodial interview where [a 
defendant] was not free to leave” is not a “Terry stop” – it is an arrest – and must be based on 
probable cause in order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  See Dunaway, supra.  
Mr. Billups’ incriminating statements were the product of his illegal arrest, and the district court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress these statements. 
 
3. Mr. Billups Decision To Provide His Cell Phone To Detective Ludwig Was A 
Fruit Of His Unreasonable Seizure And The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Motion To Suppress 
 
 Mr. Billups turned over his cell phone containing incriminating text messages only after 
he was illegally arrested, and after he provided his incriminating statements.  (Tr. Suppression 
Hearing, Ls.5-12.)  The digital information contained on an individual’s cell phone is protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.  See Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014).  The exclusionary 
rule applies when such information is obtained in violation of the owner’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.  Id. 
 As noted above, Mr. Billups was unlawfully arrested and he turned over his cell phone 
during the subsequent interrogation.  The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that 
Detective Ludwig exploited the illegal arrest when he obtained in information contained on 
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Mr. Billups’ cell phone.  See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488.  As such, the district court erred in 
denying Mr. Billups motion to suppress. 
   
C. The State Will Be Unable To Demonstrate The Error In Admitting The Incriminating 
Evidence Obtained As A Result Of Mr. Billups’ Illegal Arrest Is Harmless Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt 
 
 Where the trial court’s error is made after a timely motion or contemporaneous 
objection, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). “To hold an 
error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there 
was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.”  
State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 
 The State will be unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury hearing 
Detective Ludwig inform them that Mr. Billups admitted he knew Ms. Hoffman was picking up 
heroin and that he was planning on helping her sell the heroin in exchange for a small amount 
for himself, and the jury seeing photos of text messages showing Mr. Billups’ involvement in 
Ms. Hoffman’s heroin business, did not contribute to the verdict.  (Tr. Trial, p.376, L.13– p.379, 
L.20; p.383, L.5 – p.397, L.4; Exs. 9 through 31b.)  The only other evidence linking Mr. Billups 
to the heroin, besides his physical proximity to Ms. Hoffman when she attempted to pick it up, 
was Ms. Hoffman’s own self-serving testimony made in exchange for reduced charges.  
(Tr. Trial, p.304, L.25 – p.365, L.3.)  The incriminating evidence obtained through exploitation 
of Mr. Billups’ illegal arrest undoubtedly contributed to his conviction for trafficking in heroin.   
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Billups respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and sentence. 
 DATED this 9th day of August, 2016. 
 
      _________/s/________________ 
      JASON C. PINTLER 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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